Texas litigators have long relied on established methods of service such as personal delivery, certified mail, substituted service at a residence or workplace and, when those efforts fail, service by publication. As defendants have become increasingly difficult to locate through traditional means, however, many nonetheless maintain an active online presence. In response to this shift, the Texas Supreme Court amended Rule 106 to permit court-authorized electronic substituted service.
Rule 106(b)(2): Electronic Substituted Service
Effective December 31, 2020, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b)(2) authorizes courts to permit substituted service “in any other manner, including electronically by social media, email, or other technology,” provided the proposed method is reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit.
Under the amended rule, Texas courts may authorize service through platforms such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, X, email, or other technology. Electronic service, however, is not automatic. It remains a form of substituted service that requires prior court authorization and strict compliance with the rule’s evidentiary requirements.
How Courts Evaluate Requests for Social-Media Service
Texas courts apply a largely consistent framework when evaluating requests for service by social media. Courts generally consider whether the plaintiff first attempted traditional methods of service, whether the social-media account at issue belongs to the defendant, and whether the defendant has actively or recently used that account.
Courts also assess whether the proposed method of service is reasonably calculated to provide notice under due-process standards and whether the plaintiff can later demonstrate that service was in fact accomplished. Because substituted service implicates due-process concerns, the supporting affidavit must strictly comply with Rule 106(b)(2). The Texas Supreme Court has specifically instructed courts to consider “whether the technology actually belongs to the defendant and whether the defendant regularly uses or recently used the technology.”
Facebook Service Approved: Chrisenberry v. Ketcher
In Chrisenberry v. Ketcher (W.D. Tex. 2022), the court authorized service via Facebook after multiple unsuccessful in-person service attempts at the defendant’s last known address. The plaintiff submitted sworn affidavits from two process servers and presented evidence that the Facebook account was active and belonged to the defendant. The plaintiff also identified the defendant in photographs posted to the account and location data associated with the account aligned with the defendant’s known history.
Based on this evidentiary record, the court authorized service via Facebook, with service by publication permitted if electronic service proved unsuccessful.
When Email Service Falls Short: NexBank v. ResMac
By contrast, in NexBank v. ResMac (N.D. Tex. 2025), the court rejected a request for service by email while approving alternative service by first-class mail only. The court found that the record contained no evidence establishing that the email address in question belonged to the defendant or was being actively used.
Citing CT Cash LLC v. Anns Boyz Logistics Inc. (N.D. Tex. 2023), the court reiterated that service by email is appropriate only where a plaintiff demonstrates both diligent efforts at traditional service and recent use of the email address by the defendant. Courts have therefore often found email service more difficult to substantiate than service via social media, given the greater ability to verify ownership and recent use of social-media accounts.
International Defendants and Social-Media Service
In the international context, Cothran v. Koomson (E.D. Tex. 2021) involved a defendant believed to be located in Ghana with no known physical address. Three private investigators traced IP address data to Ghana and demonstrated that the defendant actively used Facebook, including by regularly changing profile photographs. The alleged fraud itself occurred through social media further linking the platform to the defendant.
Although the court analyzed potential issues relating to international service, it ultimately concluded that service by Facebook was not prohibited by any applicable international agreement and authorized service through that platform.
Key Takeaways from Recent Decisions
Taken together, these decisions reflect a consistent legal framework. Courts are generally receptive to service by social media where the record demonstrates multiple documented attempts at traditional service, verified ownership of the account, and recent activity showing that the platform is actively used by the defendant.
By contrast, courts remain skeptical when account ownership is unverified or speculative, the platform appears dormant, electronic service is used as a substitute for diligent efforts at traditional service, or the supporting affidavits are conclusory or unsupported by evidence.
Practical Guidance for Practitioners
For practitioners, these recent developments confirm the growing acceptance of electronic substituted service. Since the 2020 amendment to Rule 106, courts have increasingly approved such service where plaintiffs meet the rule’s requirements. Properly applied and supported by competent evidence, Rule 106(b)(2) affords a constitutionally sound means of effecting service on elusive defendants.
Farnaz Alms is a member of Kean Miller’s Offshore Energy & Marine group and practices in the firm’s Houston office. She is an experienced state and federal court litigator who handles complex offshore disputes, including maritime and admiralty matters, securities litigation, toxic tort claims, and a wide range of commercial disputes.